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NOLL V. BOZEMAN: NOTICE OF CLAIM
PROVISIONS IN MONTANA
Daniel C. Murphy
INTRODUCTION
With the adoption of a new constitution in 1972, Montana as-
sumed a unique position in the United States on the question of
sovereign immunity. While the doctrine of sovereign immunity had
been the subject of intense criticism throughout the nation and
various jurisdictions had limited or abolished the doctrine by judi-
cial decree' or legislative action,2 no state had constitutionally abro-
gated the principles of sovereign immunity as completely as Mon-
tana.3 However, the state did not long remain at the forefront. It
retreated from this forward position by enacting a constitutional
amendment in 1974. In the interim, the case of Noll v. Bozeman,4
which involved the constitutionality of the legislative response to
the constitutional abrogation of the doctrine, reached the Supreme
Court of Montana. This note will discuss the court's decision in that
case and some peripheral issues not dealt with in the opinion.
THE BACKGROUND
The 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention abolished the
protection of the sovereign from suit for its own or its employees'
torts in Article II, Section 18 of the Montana Constitution, which
provided:
The state, counties, cities, towns, and all other governmental enti-
ties shall have no immunity from suit for injury to a person or
property. This provision shall apply only to causes of action arising
after July 1, 1973.
In response to this constitutional excision, the 43rd Session of the
Montana Legislative Assembly enacted the Montana Comprehen-
sive Insurance Plan and Tort Claims Act, which was codified as § §
82-4301 through 82-4327 of the REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947.1
1. Among the states which have abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity by judi-
cial decree are Arizona (Veach v. City of Phoenix, 102 Ariz. 195, 427 P.2d 335 (1967)),
California (Muscopf v. Coming Hospital Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89
(1961)), Colorado (Evans v. Board of County Commissioners, 174 Colo. 197, 482 P.2d 968
(1971)), and Idaho (Smith v. State, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P.2d 937 (1970)).
2. Among the states which have taken legislative action to eliminate the doctrine of
sovereign immunity are Alaska, Nebraska, and Nevada.
3. Illinois abolished the doctrine with these terms in its 1970 Constitution in Article 13,
§ 4: "Except as may be provided by law, sovereign immunity in this state is abolished."
4. - Mont. -, 534 P.2d 880, 32 St. Rptr. 415 (1975).
5. Ch. 380, Laws of 1973.
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At the same time, the legislature repealed or revised sections of
Chapter 7 of Title 83 to implement Section 18 of Article I1.6
The Montana Comprehensive Insurance Plan and Tort Claims
Act appears to have been based on Idaho's statute on tort claims
against governmental entities.' Idaho's statute limits the amount of
the state's liability, excludes state liability for certain acts, and
imposes certain procedural requirements on claimants.' The Mon-
tana Act does not exclude state liability for any act or limit the
amount of liability the state can incur. However, the Idaho statute's
procedural requirements were retained as part of the Montana Act.,
The procedural requirements include the notice of claim provisions
which were contested in Noll v. Bozeman and a companion case,
Keneady v. Bozeman.'0
Both suits resulted from one accident, which occurred on Au-
gust 17, 1973, on a Bozeman city street. The plaintiffs, Noll and
Keneady, were seated in Keneady's car, parked at a street curb,
when a pavement roller struck the car from behind. The roller,
which was owned by the State of Montana, was on loan to the city
of Bozeman and operated by a city employee. Both Noll and Ke-
neady suffered injuries as a result of the accident. In the months
following the accident, the city's insurance adjuster investigated the
accident, contacted the occupants of the car and discussed their
claims with them. The adjuster attempted unsuccessfully to settle
Keneady's claim. On April 8, 1974, more than seven months after
the accident, Noll and Keneady filed separate actions against the
State of Montana, the City of Bozeman, and the employee-operator
of the roller." The initial complaints were dismissed with leave to
refile. Upon refiling, all the defendants again moved for dismissal.
The District Court, while denying the motions of the city and its
employee, granted the motion of the State of Montana on the
ground that the plaintiffs had failed to comply with the notice of
claim requirements of § 82-4311, R.C.M. 1947, and that therefore,
their claims were barred under § 82-4314, R.C.M. 1947. Section 82-
4311 provides:
All claims against the state arising under the provisions of this.
6. Section 83-701 was revised and § 83-706 was repealed and replaced by § 83-706.1 in
Chapter 93, Laws of 1973.
7. IDAHO CODE ANNOTATED, § 6-901 et seq. (1947) [hereinafter cited as I.C.A. 1947].
8. I.C.A. 1947, §§ 6-904, 6-924.
9. This information was gained from an unpublished manuscript of D. Robert Lohn,
which was made available to the author.
10. Noll, supra note 4; Keneady v. Bozeman, - Mont. __, 534 P.2d 880, 32 St.
Rptr. 415 (1975).
11. State ex rel. Bozeman v. District Court, __ Mont. __, 531 P. .2d 1343, 32 St.
Rptr. 205 (1975).
1976]
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act shall be presented to and filed with the secretary of state within
one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the occurrence
from which the claim arose or when the injury should reasonably
have been discovered, whichever is later.
A similar provision, § 82-4312 R.C.M. 1947, relates to claims against
the political subdivisions of the state. Such claims must be filed
within the same time period with the clerk or secretary of the subdi-
vision. Section 82-4314 provides the penalty for failure to comply
with the filing requirements. It states that no action shall be allowed
against any governmental entity unless the claim was filed within
the one hundred twenty day time period.
THE COURT'S OPINION
The plaintiffs appealed from the District Court's order, arguing
that § § 82-4311 and 82-4314 were unconstitutional violations of Sec-
tion 18 of Article II of the 1972 Montana Constitution and that the
statutory provisions denied them equal protection of the laws as
guaranteed by the United States and Montana constitutions. The
Supreme Court of Montana did not reach the equal protection ques-
tion, but unanimously accepted the plaintiffs' contention that the
sections relied upon by the District Court in its order violated Arti-
cle I, Section 18. The court, in an opinion by Justice Haswell,
viewed the challenged statutes as an attempt to reinstate a limited
form of sovereign immunity. This, the court found, was clearly con-
trary to the intent of Article II, Section 18. The court's examination
of the history of Section 18 revealed that the Constitutional Conven-
tion intended to eliminate the doctrine of sovereign immunity and
did not intend to grant the legislature the authority to impose limi-
tations upon that resolve." The Convention considered a provision
abolishing sovereign immunity which was drawn from the proposed
North Dakota Constitution of 1972. That provision would have al-
lowed the legislature to impose reasonable limitations upon the ini-
tiation of suits against the state and its subdivisions. The delegates
discussed that provision but chose not to adopt it.
Justice Haswell's opinion rejected the defendant's argument
that Article II, Section 18 merely denied the state the right to raise
the defense of sovereign immunity. The court appeared to view this
as an argument based on semantics. For it, the important fact was
that the constitution had denied the state immunity from suit. The
court also rejected the argument that the challenged sections were,
in effect, a statute of limitations. Justice Haswell pointed out that
§ 82-4317, R.C.M. 1947, provided a time limitation upon the bring-
12. Id. at 417-418.
[Vol. 37
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ing of suits against governmental entities and adequately protected
those entities from stale and fraudulent claims. On the other hand,
Justice Haswell thought that §§ 82-4311 and 82-4314 sought to im-
pose a condition precedent to the maintenance of actions against
governmental entities.
It should be noted that some difficulty is likely to arise concern-
ing this point. Section 82-4317 states that a claim is barred if not
brought within two years after the claim is presented to the govern-
mental entity. Thus, the operation of the statute of limitation con-
tained in § 82-4317 depends on the filing requirements of § 82-4311.
With the latter section no longer operative, the effect of the statute
of limitation provision is unclear. The court did not anticipate this
problem and its resolution is left for another case or for legislative
action.
THE AMENDED SECTION EIGHTEEN
The court also did not consider the effect of the recent amend-
ment of Article II, Section 18, which became effective on July 1,
1975, but which did not apply to the facts of this case. Section 18
now reads:
The state, counties, cities, towns and all other local governmental
entities shall have no immunity from suit for injury to a person or
property, except as may be specifically provided by law by a 2/3
vote of each house of the legislature.'"
It is interesting to note that the Montana Compreshensive Insur-
ance and Tort Claims Act was unanimously passed by the Montana
Senate and, with some amendments, passed the House of Repre-
sentatives by a vote of 89 to 5.'4 The House amendments were subse-
quently accepted unanimously by the Senate.'5 These figures lose
their significance when it is observed that the usual rule is that "an
unconstitutional statute is wholly void from the time of its enact-
ment and is not validated by a subsequent constitutional change
which would allow enactment of such a statute."'6 Montana follows
this rule. In State ex rel. Woodahl v. District Court,'7 the Montana
supreme court held that previously invalidated gambling statutes
were not revived by the passage of the 1972 Montana Constitution
which contained Article Ill, Section 9, permitting the legislature to
authorize forms of gambling.'8 However, a constitutional amend-
13. MONT. CONST. art. 2 § 18.
14. 1973 Montana Senate Journal 557; 1973 Montana House Journal 908.
15. 1973 Montana Senate Journal 891.
16. Fellows v. Shultz, 81 N. M. 496, 469 P. 2d 141, 146 (1970).
17. 162 Mont. 283, 511 P.2d 318 (1973).
18. See also State v. Safeway Stores, 106 Mont. 182, 76 P.2d 81 (1938).
19761
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ment can validate prior unconstitutional statutes when the amend-
ment, expressly or impliedly, ratifies or confirms those statutes.'"
But the amended Section 18 of Article II does not expressly mention
those portions of the Tort Claims Act held invalid in Noll. Further-
more, it cannot be said to impliedly ratify those sections because it
had been drafted and enacted before Noll was decided. Thus, it
remains to a future legislature to determine whether the filing re-
quirements of §§ 82-4311 and 82-4314 will be reimposed.
It may still be argued, however, that other constitutional
grounds exist for an attack on notice of claim provisions. The
amended Section 18 declares that the state and its subdivisions
"shall have no immunity from suit . . . , except as may be specifi-
cally provided by law by a 2/3 vote of each house of the legisla-
ture." 20 Taking those terms on their face, it can be argued that the
legislature is empowered to provide only full or partial immunity
from suit for governmental entities, but nothing less. For example,
immunity might be provided for such entities when engaged in cer-
tain activities. Section 18 does not appear to empower the legisla-
ture to impose lesser restrictions on the right of injured parties to
bring tort actions against the state and its subdivisions." Thus,
notice of claim provisions, limits on the amount of liability, exclu-
sions of punitive damages, attorneys' fees and interest,22 may be
prohibited under the terms of Section 18 and the legislature would
have no power to re-enact the notice of claim provisions of Title 82,
Chapter 43.
Such a result would be consistent with recent judicial views of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Courts have been carefully ex-
amining the doctrine and many have found it unjustifiable. As men-
tioned before, a number of courts have judicially abolished the doc-
trine, while other courts have found methods to limit it.23 The Ore-
gon supreme court, while stating that it could not judicially abro-
gate a principle which was embodied in the state's constitution,
held that the constitutional language should be construed as nar-
19. Fellows v. Shultz, supra note 15 at 147.
20. MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 18.
21. Argument found in the unpublished manuscript of D.R. Lohn, supra note 9.
22. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA § 82-4324 (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947],
prohibits awards of punitive damages, attorneys' fees, or interest to those who sue the State
of Montana under the terms of the Montana Comprehensive Insurance Plan and Tort Claims
Act.
23. Some states have held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not apply when
the government engages in proprietary activities. Gillespie v. City of Los Angeles, 114 Cal.
App.2d.513, 250 P.2d 717 (1952); Youngstown Mines Corp. v. Prout, 266 Minn. 450, 124
N.W.2d 328 (1963). Other states have held that a state gives implied consent to be sued on a
contract when it enters one. Ace Flying Service, Inc. v. Colorado Dept. of Agriculture, 136
Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957).
210 [Vol. 37
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rowly as possible because the court viewed the concept of sovereign
immunity as "indefensible." 24 Should a case similar to Noll ever
again reach the Montana court, it could justifiably reach the same
conclusion.
EQUAL PROTECTION AND NOTICE OF CLAIM PROVISIONS
The plaintiffs in Noll also argued that the filing requirements
of § § 82-4311 and 82-4314 denied them equal protection of the laws
in violation of the United States25 and Montana" constitutions. The
court refused to reach the question and rested its decision on the
ground discussed above. Nonetheless, the equal protection argu-
ment merits a brief discussion.
The Equal Protection Clause requires that statutory classifica-
tions have some relationship to legitimate governmental purposes.
An exposition of the equal protection question can reveal whether
good reasons exist to support the re-enactment of the invalidated
notice of claim provisions, and, at the same time, gauge the likeli-
hood of a successful equal protection challenge to any notice of
claim requirements which the legislature may enact.
Formulating an equal protection argument presents some diffi-
culty for the advocate, as it is an area of law which is undergoing
change. The problem arises in determining the appropriate test to
apply to the challenged statute. One established line of precedent
requires that legal classifications "bear some rational relationship
to a legitimate state end."27 This "rational basis" test has recently
been supplemented with another, which provides that, if a legal
classification affects a "fundamental right"2 or is itself an "inher-
ently suspect"29 classification, it can stand only if it is necessary to
promote a "compelling state interest."3 Recently, the United States
Supreme Court has manifested some discontent with this two-tiered
approach to equal protection and appears to have formulated a
third test-the rational basis test with an added "bite".3' This new-
est equal protection test has been variously phrased to require a
classification to "rest on some ground of difference having a fair and
24. State v. Shinkle, - Or. __, 373 P.2d 674, 680 (1962).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. xiv.
26. MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 4.
27. McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
28. Such as the right to interstate movement, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638
(1969); or the right to vote, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
29. Such as race, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); or alienage, Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
30. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra note 27 at 638.
31. See generally, Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1972).
1976]
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substantial relation to the object of the legislation,"3" or to rationally
further "some legitimate, articulated state purpose." 3  This test has
not replaced the prior tests but its exact application remains uncer-
tain.
Before any test is applied, a statutory classification must be
identified. Notice of claim provisions make classifications among
tortfeasors and tort victims. The class of tortfeasors is divided into
governmental tortfeasors, who are entitled to notice, and non-
governmental tortfeasors, to whom notice is not necessary. Simi-
larly, the class of tort victims is split into victims of governmental
torts, who must give notice within a specified time period, and
victims of private torts, who need not fulfill that requirement. 34 The
failure to file notice in tort actions involving the government results
in a bar to an action for damages, leaving the tort victim without a
remedy and the governmental tortfeasor without liability.
While such a consequence may have disastrous effects on a tort
victim, the classification which gives rise to that consequence does
not affect a fundamental right or involve a suspect classification.
Therefore, the compelling state interest test cannot be applied. In
Boddie v. Connecticut,35 the Supreme Court seemed to view access
to the courts as a right of some importance. However, in the later
cases of United Staes v. Kras36 and Ortwein v. Schwab,37 the Court
looked more to the interests affected by lack of access to the courts
than to the right of access itself. However, Kras and Ortwein do
point to the equal protection test which is applicable to cases where
access to the courts is in question. Both cases involved the payment
of filing fees as a condition precedent to court action on the plain-
tiff's requests. Upon finding no fundamental freedom involved, the
Court stated that the appropriate test was the rational basis test.
Are there rational bases for the classification which results from
notice of claim provisions? Legislatures and courts have found ade-
quate reasons to support enacting and sustaining notice of claim
provisions. The Montana supreme court offered one such reason in
the 1910 case of Tonn v. City of Helena.3 The case involved an equal
protection challenge to a notice of claim provision. Persons who were
injured as a result of a defect in a city street or sidewalk were
required to give notice of their claim and of the defect within sixty
days of the injury. The court rejected the equal protection argument
32. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
33. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973).
34. Reich v. State Highway Department, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972).
35. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
36. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
37. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
38. 42 Mont. 127, 111 P. 715 (1910).
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and found reason for the filing requirement in the fact that the
public officers who governed municipalities had interests so exten-
sive that they could not ascertain the facts of the municipalities'
liability as well as an individual or a corporation."9 This is one of the
more common justifications for notice of claim provisions-that a
governmental entity needs notice to insure that the facts of its lia-
bility are promptly investigated. The Michigan supreme court re-
sponded to a similar argument in Grubaugh v. City of St. Johns,40
which was decided on due process grounds. There, the court said:
Even if we assume the above original policy considerations were
once valid [the prompt investigation justification], today they
have lost their validity and ceased to exist due to changed circum-
stances. In recent years most governmental units and agencies
have purchased liability insurance as authorized by statute. In
addition to insurance investigators, they have police departments
and full-time attorneys at their disposal to promptly investigate
the causes and effects of accidents occurring on streets and high-
ways. As a result, these units and agencies are better prepared to
investigate and defend negligence suits than are most private tort-
feasors to whom no special notice privileges have been granted by
the legislature.4 '
In Montana, all governmental entities are authorized to purchase
liability insurance." As a consequence, governmental units often
have the assistance of insurance investigators. In addition, it must
be a rare circumstance for a governmental entity not to have some
knowledge of a liability-producing incident. It may be noted that in
Noll, the employee-operator of the roller reported the accident to his
superiors, who notified the city's insurance adjuster. He promptly
began an investigation.43 However, it must be pointed out that the
prompt investigation justification would apply in those instances
which involve only one governmental employee who fails to report
the incident, or isolated government property where the incident
does not result in conspicuous side effects, such as the interruption
of governmental services. These instances would surely be uncom-
mon. They provide poor justification for legislation which denies
tort victims their day in court.
Another justification offered for notification requirements is
that it allows a governmental entity to quickly remedy defects in
public property which have caused an injury. In response, it can be
said that notice of claim provisions are both under- and over-
39. Id. at 134.
40. 384 Mich. 165, 180 N.W.2d 778 (1970).
41. Id. at 784.
42. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 82-4306, 82-4309.
43. State ex rel. The City of Bozeman v. District Court, supra note 11 at 206.
1976]
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inclusive. Because such provisions apply only to those tort victims
who intend to bring suit, the information which a governmental unit
receives about defects in public property is limited." On the other
hand, the statute applies regardless of whether the injury arose from
a defect in public property or from the actions of a public employee.
Notice from those injured by governmental employees does not
serve the purpose of protecting the public from defective public
property. While the rational basis test does not require that catego-
ries be precisely drawn or that statutes be narrowly drawn to further
the appropriate governmental interest,45 a seriously over-inclusive
classification, such as the one above, may move a court to invalidate
it as not rationally related to the state's purpose. For a legislature,
intent on enacting notice of claim provisions, the safest course
would be to limit notice requirements to claims arising from defects
in government property.
A third basis offered for notice of claim provisions is that gov-
ernments need notice of their liabilities in order to budget properly.
This argument loses some of its persuasiveness when it is noted that
most governmental entities have insurance coverage. The Washing-
ton supreme court replied to this argument in Hunter v. North
Mason High School." There, the court said that "[s]pecial notice
. . .does little to facilitate budget planning, as governmental enti-
ties so small as to be unable to use actuarial methods to forecast
liabilities and self-insure, usually will purchase insurance." 7
Finally, many argue that the notice of claim provisions give
governmental entities an early opportunity to ascertain their liabil-
ity and to promptly settle the claim against them. Yet, notice of
claim requirements will often require attorneys for claimants to file
notice containing an inflated estimate of damages. The claimant
may still be hospitalized or under treatment. In such circumstances,
attorneys will likely increase their damage estimates rather than
take the chance that their estimates may be seriously understated.
Such claims would provide little basis for compromise or settle-
ment. The parties are not in a position to negotiate until the true
damages are ascertained."
While the deficiencies of these justifications can be pointed out,
most cannot be entirely discounted by the existence of liability in-
surance. The arguments presented above may induce the legislature
44. Note, Notice of Claims Provisions: An Equal Protection Perspective, 60 CORNELL
L. REv. 417, 442 (1975).
45. Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U.S. 224 (1914).
46. - Wash.2d _, 539 P.2d 845 (1975).
47. Id. at 849.
48. Comment, The Constitutionality of California's Public Entity Tort Claims
Statutes, 6 PAc. L. J. 30, 38 (1975).
[Vol. 37
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to forego the re-enactment of notice of claim requirements. But,
they may not move a court to invalidate such provisions on equal
protection grounds. The rational basis test is applied to legislative
decisions with a great deal of deference. If any possible basis can be
found for a challenged statute, the court will sustain it. Equal pro-
tection challenges to notice of claim statutes have not faired well,
having been accepted in only three states.49 For these reasons, an
equal protection challenge to notice of claim provisions is not a
strong argument, and the Tonn precedent complicates the problem
in Montana.
The judicial deference inherent in the rational basis test is illus-
trated in two of the three cases which accept the equal protection
argument. In the latest case, Hunter, the court systematically re-
viewed the rationale of notice of claim statutes. After discounting
the justifications presented above, the court looked to the position
of the state, as expressed by the legislature, on suits against the
state. The Washington legislature had abolished sovereign immun-
ity and stated its intention to hold the state and its subdivisions
liable for their torts as if they were individuals or corporations.
Further, the legislature had repealed a statue which stated that the
state's consent to be sued did not affect notice requirements. Find-
ing that the legislative policy was to forego placing procedural road-
blocks in the way of claimants, the court held it could not sustain
the notice requirements "simply because they serve to protect the
public treasury. Absent that justification, there is no basis, substan-
tial or even rational, on which their discrimination between govern-
mental plaintiffs [sic] and others can be supported."50 The Su-
preme Court of Michigan in Reich v. State Highway Department5
also looked to their legislature for an expression of intent to place
all tort victims on an equal footing before holding notice require-
ments violative of the Equal Protection Clause. In Montana, the
intent of the Constitutional Convention no longer controls in this
area. The re-enactment of notice of claim provisions would be an
expression of legislative intent that the state not have the same tort
liability of individuals or corporations.
CONCLUSION
Montana is now without a notice of claim requirement. Al-
though § 82-4312 was not affected by the ruling in Noll and therefore
49. Nevada: Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879 (1973); Michigan: Reich v.
State Highway Department, supra note 33; and Washington: Hunter v. North Mason High
School, supra note 45.
50. Hunter v. North Mason High School, supra note 45 at 850.
51. Reich v. State Highway Department, supra note 33.
1976]
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still applies to claims against the political subdivisions of the state,
it depends for its enforcement upon § 82-4314, which was declared
invalid. Hopefully, Montana will remain without notice of claim
provisions. Whether it does seems to be a determination which rests
solely with the legislature. The justifications for such provisions
have some limited validity but they do not carry the weight they
appear to on first glance. Their remaining validity may require a
court to uphold notice of claim provisions, if challenged on equal
protection grounds. However, their makeweight character should
move the legislature to forego the re-enactment of such require-
ments. Should the legislature nonetheless reimpose these provisions
in Montana, her citizens' only hope to avoid their effect may rest
on the narrow language of the amended Section 18 of Article 11.52
52. The Senate-House Interim Judiciary Committee of the Montana Legislature has
recommended against restoring substantial sovereign immunity for the state. The committee
has tentatively recommended legislation to:
-Limit damages to actual economic loss such as medical bills and loss of wages.
-Prohibit punitive damages and recovery for intangible damages such as pain and
suffering and emotional distress.
-Limit the amount each person can recover for each occurrence and the amount
that can be recovered for a single occurrence injuring or damaging many persons.
A. Hutchinson, Panel Advising Against Return to State Sovereign Immunity, The Mis-
soulian, Nov. 25, 1975, p. 13 at col. 1-4.
[Vol. 37
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